PUDUKKOTTAI STATE
NATIONAL WAR FRONT BUREAU

BULLETIN] FEBRUARY 6, 1943 [No. 132

LECTURE CXXXII.

# RUSSIA'S MASTER PLAN—1918 AND 1943.

(*From 'The Daily Herald'*)

What is the master-plan behind the daily news of the Russian blows in half a dozen different sectors of the enormous eastern front?

For on the eve of 1943 there is a master plan for Hitler's ultimate Russian discomfiture—make no mistake about it. I believe that the plan closely resembles the strategy of the Allies at the Western Front in 1918 and that, in its usual rather indefinite way, history is repeating itself.

In the spring of this year just as in 1918 the German High Command had local superiority of force on the main battle front which was unlikely to last more than a few months, and it had decided how best to use its superiority to break down the enemy's resistance as quickly as possible and induce him to accept terms of peace. The Allied resources, like those of the Allies in 1918, were growing and if the critical period of temporary inferiority could be survived, the balance would then turn, more and more, in Russia's favour. The German aim was in each case to strike a swift and annihilating blow; that of their enemy was to gain time to hold out and be ready to pass to the offensive as soon as the German superiority disappeared.

The German strategy, both in 1942 and 1918, was to put the whole weight behind one heavy-punch at a time and exploit it to the full in an endeavour to obtain a decision by smashing up hostile resistance. If they could rupture the hostile line and shatter it to fragments they might win the victory even at the eleventh hour; even though the time left while they still had the necessary superiority was short and fleeting.

## THE TURNING POINT.

We know the result in each case. In 1918, first on Somme and then on the Aisne and the Marne, the Germans were within a reasonable distance of full success. The turning point came when the Germans had frittered away their superiority in a series of spectacular but abortive efforts and the Allies had accumulated enough reserves to pass to the offensive in their turn.

The same thing is repeating itself now in Russia. Both at Stalingrad and in the Caucasus, the Germans rushed forward with such vigour, speed and fury that it seemed they could not fail to rupture the Russian line and score really decisively. But they failed. In the end, worn out with the chase of the phantom, they came to the end of their strength and had to halt Now, assured of increasing superiority over the enemy, our Allies are delivering a series of separate and inter-connected blows, each one aimed at one of the enemy's weak spots on his long and sinuous front.

## MARSHAL FOCH'S PLAN.

Marshal Foch in 1918 devised this plan of a series of short range and quickly delivered punches aimed at one hostile weak point after another and broken off as soon as resistance stiffened in the front of each one so as to make further effort there uneconomical. As soon as this happened, another punch would follow in another sector which, if successful, would have the effect of creating another enemy pocket from where he would have to withdraw unless he was to risk having the troops holding it cut off and lost. The Russian High command is using the same methods to-day.

It is the strategy of the side whose forces are growing in contrast to those of the enemy. So 1918 may thus serve as a forecast of 1943. And the ultimate issue of the contest between these rival strategists bids fair to be the same now as it was then.

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# WEEKLY WAR SUMMARY.

## 30—1—43 to 5—2—43.

**Russia**.—The battle for STALINGRAD has come to an end. Field Marshal Paulus, the German Commander has been taken prisoner. A German communiqué quoted by the Berlin Radio on Febuary 3 gives the reason as follows:—

'The German Army completely encircled by the enemy tied down strong enemy forces for a number of weeks. But the encirclement continued and the *Luftwaffe* in spite of its utmost efforts and very heavy losses was no

longer in a position to deliver sufficient supplies by air. The possibility of being relieved faded further and further into the distance and finally completely disappeared.'

During the week the Soviet offensive has resulted in the reoccupation of GORYACHI, south of KRASNADOR; of EGORLYK, KURGANAYA, GULKE VICHI, KROPOTKIN, TIKHORETSK and MAIKOP in North CAUCASUS; of BELAYA GLINA in the Lower Don; of GORSHECH NOYE on the VORONEJ front; of KUPYANSK (near KHARKOV) and of ZOLOTUKHINO and VOZY in the area north of KURSK.

Thus the new Soviet strategy of cutting off communications rather than seizing strongholds is making headway all along the battle-line. The STALINGRAD and VORONEJ areas have been cleared. Russian forces are advancing in the VELIKIYE LUKI and RZHEV sectors. German resistance is dwindling before LENINGRAD. Large-scale movements having ended in the CAUCASUS the enemy is retiring to his strongholds on the TAMAN Peninsula and striving to escape by the Straits of Kerch. But here the Russians are at his throat. Here Russian offensive, with two prongs is drawing near ROSTOV on the one hand and NOVOROSSISK on the Black Sea on the other hand. In fact the battle of ROSTOV has already begun at one end and at the other end the Russian Black Sea Fleet has started plastering German positions on the coast.

**Tripolitania.**—Elements of the 8th Army capturing ZAUIA on January 25 contacted the enemy in the SABARATHA area on the coast on the 27th and their forward forces crossed the Tunisian border on the 29th. Taking ZILTEN town on the way they reached the Mareth Line in the MATAMATA area on February 3.

In Eastern Sahara French and Fighting French troops occupied FORSIN on January 21 and advanced on GHADAMES at the southern corner of LIBYA.

**Tunisia.**—The American Army concentrated at TEBASSA has started an offensive. American troops advancing towards the rear of the Mareth Line have captured MAKANASSI, 74 miles north-west of the line between GAFSA and SFAX and SENED, 25 miles west of MAKANASSI. In southern TUNISIA Allied troops attacked the enemy at FAID; in central TUNISIA the enemy made a slight temporary advance in the hills south-west of PONT DU FAHS and in Northern TUNISIA Allied patrols were active.

**The Solomons.**—Air and surface engagements between the U. S. and Japanese forces in the GUADALCANAR area are continuing, with losses on both sides. On February 1, U. S. ground forces crossed the Bonezi river and were continuing their advance. On land, all resistance has been overcome and Col. Knox,

the U. S. Naval Secretary, thinks that with in about a month all organised resistance should disappear in GUADALCANAR.

**New-Guinea.**—The fall of SANANANDA has been followed by the capture of GUINEA on the Papuan coast. Japanese attempts to cross the Buo and Crystal Creek rivers have been foiled.

In addition to WEWAK, MADANG, FINSCHHFEN, and LAE already occupied by the enemy the Japanese are reported to have taken over new centres on the northern coast of NEW GUINEA and converted them into strong air and naval bases.

**China.**—There was some heavy fighting near MONG PANG on the CHINA—BURMA border. In the south-west of the YUNNAN Province a Japanese attempt to cross the Nanlei river was repelled. In Eastern HONAN a Japanese attack in the direction of HSIAYI and MUNCHENG was resisted.

**Burma.**—On the ASSAM Front British-Indian patrols were operating in the TAMU area. An encounter occurred between a party of the Chin levies and a Japanese patrol. On the MAYU Peninsula there was hard fighting in the vicinity of DOMBAIK.

The following R. A. F. raids are reported for the week. Jan. 24. Rangoon; Jan. 25. NABA; Jan. 26. MANDALAY, SHADUZUP, MAZA, TOUNGOO, and transports on the Chindwin river and off the ARAKAN coast; Jan. 28 MAYU and AKYAB areas, AKYAB Island and ARAKAN coast; Feb. 2, RATHEDAUNG, and AKYAB Island.

# ALLIED AIR RAIDS.

**24—1—43 (Sunday).**

**NIGHT:—**

**Laying mines** in enemy coastal waters.

**NORTH AFRICA & MEDITERRANEAN.**

**Shipping** at ZUARA harbour (LIBYA).
**The landing ground** at BEN GARDANE.
**The docks** at TUNIS and BIZRRTA.
**Railway tracks and buildings** in SICILY.

**RUSSIA.**

**Air combats and aircraft on the ground** all along the entire Russian Front.

**FAR EAST.**

**The aerodrome** at LAE and SALAMAUA (N. Guinea), GASMATA (N. Britain).
**The harbour** at RABAUL (N. Britain).
**DILLI** (Timor)
**The airfield** at CAPE GLOUCESTER.
**A ship** in the SOLOMONS Sea.
**SHWEBO aerodrome** in Burma.
**Villages** on the AKYAB Island.
**Shipping** off the ARAKAN coast.
**Docks and shipping** at RANGOON.

**25—1—43. (Monday).**

**EUROPE.**

**DAY:—**

**The docks and oil storage tanks** at FLUSHING (1 R.A.F. bomber missing).

**NORTH AFRICA and MEDITERRANEAN.**

**The port** of ZUARA.
**Railways** in southern TUNISIA.
**SFAX.**
**Supply lines** in TUNISIA and SICILY.

**RUSSIA.**

**Air combats and grounded aircraft** all over the Eastern battlefield.

**FAR EAST.**

**WAKE** Island (2 Jap planes destroyed).
**The aerodrome** at LAE and FINSCHHAFEN (N. Guinea).
**The port** at SALAMAUA.
**Shipping and harbour** at RABAUL (N. Britain).
The aerodrome at GASMATA (N. Britain).
**Motor transport** TAUNGOP-PADAUNG road (Burma).
**The aerodrome** at SHWEBO (Burma).
**Shipping** along the ARAKAN coast.
**HEHO** aerodrome (Burma).

26—1—43 (Tuesday).

**EUROPE.**

**DAY:—**

**Offensive sweeps** over Northern FRANCE and BELGIUM.

**NIGHT:—**

**The submarine base** at LORIENT (France) (2 Allied planes missing).

**A railway target** at BRUGES (4 Allied planes and 3 enemy planes lost).

**NORTH AFRICA and MEDITERRANEAN.**

**A railway line** at JEFNA (Tunisia).
**Aerodromes** in TUNISIA.
**ZUARA.**
**Harbours and aerodromes** in ITALY and SICILY.

**RUSSIA.**

**Air combats and grounded aircraft** all along the Russian Front.

**FAR EAST.**

**An air-field** on BALLALE Island (Shortlands).
**Aerodromes** at LAE and SALAMAUA.
**Rail-roads** at MANDALAY (Burma).
**A bridge** at SHADUZUP (Burma).
**Traffic** at MEZA (Burma).
**The railway junction** at NABA (Burma).

27—1—43 (Wednesday).

**DAY:—**

**EUROPE (6 planes missing).**

**Shipyards** at COPENHAGEN.
**Railway targets** in BRITTANY.
**Ships** off the DUTCH coast.

**NIGHT:—**

**Industrial objectives** in the RHINELAND including DUSSELDORF.
**Railway communications** in southern ITALY.

**NORTH AFRICA.**

**The harbour** at BIZERTA.
**The harbour and railway yards** at SFAX.
**PONT DU FAHS** area.
**Rail communications** in SICILY.

**RUSSIA.**

**Air combats and grounded aircraft** all along the entire Russian Front.

**FAR EAST.**

**The areodrome** at GASMATA (N. Britain).
**The areodromes** at LAE and FINSCH HAFEN (N. Guinea).
**The buildings** at FAAN and ROEMAAL.
**A ship** off DOBO.
**Enemy positions** at MUBO.
**Jap occupied village** of MAGYICHAUNG.
**KYETTAWBYIN** (Akyab Island).

28—1—43 (Thursday).

**EUROPE.**

**NIGHT:—**

**Laying mines** in enemy coastal waters.

**NORTH AFRICA and MEDITERRANEAN.**

**The airfield** at TUNIS.
**The dock area** at BIZERTA.
**A convoy** between SICILY and TUNISIA.
**PONT DU FAHS** area.

**RUSSIA.**

**Air combats and grounded aircraft** all along the Russian Front.

**FAR EAST.**

**Jap ships** in OPEN BAY (N. Britain).
**The aerodromes** at LAE and FINSCHHAFEN (N. Guinea).
**The harbour** at MUBO.
**Villages** in the AKYAB area.
**RATHEDAUNG** (Burma).

29—1—43 (Friday).

**EUROPE (4 Allied planes missing).**

**DAY:—**

**Railway viaduct** at MORLAIX (France).
**Objectives** at IJMUIDEN (Holland).
**Bays and locomotives** in Northern FRANCE and BELGIUM.
**A supply ship** off the coast of NORWAY.

**NIGHT:—**

**The submarine base** at LORIENT (4 Allied planes missing).

**NORTH AFRICA & MEDITERRANEAN.**

**Airfields** at TUNIS and BIZERTA.
**Targets** north of GABES (Tunisia).
**The aerodrome** at MESSINA (Sicily).
**OUSSELTIA** valley.

**RUSSIA.**

**Air combats and aircraft on the ground** all along the Eastern Front.

**FAR EAST.**

**The airfields** at CAPE GLOUSTER and GASMATA (N. Britain).
**MUBO** (N. Guinea).
**The aerodromes** at LAE and SALAMAUA.
**The aerodrome** at SHWEBO (Burma).
**Villages** in the AKYAB area.

30—1—43 (Saturday).

**EUROPE (5 Allied planes missing).**

**DAY:—**

**BERLIN** (twice attacked).
**The port** of EMDEN.

**NIGHT:—**

**The docks** at HAMBURG (Germany).
**Other objectives** in Western GERMANY.
**Air combats** over BAY of BISCAY.

**NORTH AFRICA and MEDITERRANEAN.**

**The docks** at FERRYVILLE.
**Rail and road targets** near GABES.
**The harbour** at BIZERTA.
**Rail and road communications** in TUNISIA and SICILY.
**The aerodrome** at MEDENINE (Tunisia).

**RUSSIA.**

**Air combats and grounded aircraft** all along the entire Russian battlefield.

**FAR EAST.**

**MUBO** area in (N. Guinea).
**The aerodrome and the harbour** at RABAUL.
**A ship** in OPEN BAY.
**The aerodrome** at LAE (N. Guinea).
**Supply dumps** at SALAMAUA (N. Britain).
YEGYANABIN and KHADINBAIK (Akyab Island).
**Reconnaissance** over MAYU Peninsula.
**Villages** on the AKYAB Island.

# ENEMY AIR RAIDS.

**25—1—43 (Monday). BRITAIN.**

**Coastal areas** in South-east ENGLAND.

**NORTH AFRICA.**

**Air combats** over BENGARDANE (1 plane shot down).

**FAR EAST.**

**An airfield** in GUADALCANAR.

**26—1—43 (Tuesday).**

**BRITAIN.**

**DAY:—**

South-east and South-west ENGLAND (1 enemy plane destroyed).

**RUSSIA.**

**Russian armies** behind the forward lines.

**FAR EAST.**

The aerodrome at MILNE BAY (no damage).

**The aerodrome** at PORT MORESBY.

**27—1—43 (Wednesday).**

**BRITAIN.**

No information available.

**NORTH AFRICA.**

**The allied base** at ALGIERS.

**FAR EAST.**

**The aerodrome** at MILNE BAY.

**28—1—43 (Thursday).**

**BRITAIN.**

**The coast of** EAST ANGLIA in BRITAIN.

**NORTH AFRICA.**

**Air battles** over ZUARA (Libya).

**FAR EAST.**

**A vessel** off WESSEL Island.

**The aerodrome** at PORT MORESBY (1 Jap plane shot down).

**29—1—43 (Friday).**

**BRITAIN.**

**South-east coast** of BRITAIN.

**NORTH AFRICA.**

**BONE** (Algeria).

**RUSSIA.**

**Air protection** to ground troops in the VORONEZ area.

**FAR EAST.**

**Air-field** at GUADALCANAR.

**30—1—43 (Saturday).**

**BRITAIN.**

No information available.

**NORTH AFRICA.**

**SIDI BOU IZID** area.

**FAR EAST.**

**A small Allied vessel** off GUADALCANAR.

**31—1—43 (Sunday).**

**BRITAIN.**

No air attack anywhere in BRITAIN.

**NORTH AFRICA.**

**Air combats** over TUNISIA.

**FAR EAST.**

No information.

# SIDE LIGHTS.

**A FEAR-HAUNTED ANNIVERSARY.** Last Saturday (Jan. 30) was the occasion of the 10th anniversary of Hitler's accession to power when, according to custom Hitler should have addressed his party in person but he preferred to stay away and issue a proclamation instead, for the reason, as truthful Goebbels has announced, that Hitler was 'detained at his headquarters in the East by the hard necessities of war.' But there is every reason to believe that fear ruled the decision as much as anything else—fear to face a disappointed people at home, and fear of his angry comrades to whom he was no longer an infallible leader. Field-Marshal Goering, who was to be the orator of the occasion in the absence of Hitler, was found to be hiding in fear inside an air-raid shelter at the hour fixed for the celebration because the R. A. F. had chosen the self-same hour to pay its first day-light visit to BERLIN; and Goebbels also found himself dismayed by a repetition of the R. A. F's visit as soon as he began to speak to the Nazi party in the afternoon at the Sports Palast.

The proclamation and the speeches, far from befitting an occasion of rejoicing also bore the impress of fear and terror. Hitler's proclamation was filled with the fear of 'the flood from the east', of the great Soviet armies which were rolling back the invader across the continent. It was no longer a war of victors and vanquished, as the proclamation announced, but it was one of survivors and destroyed. Goering cried, "Experts had warned us: 'For God's sake, don't touch RUSSIA: don't provoke her.' But Hitler did touch and provoke RUSSIA, with what result as we now see. In Goering's own words 'Providence which had hitherto smiled on the German arms had now left the Germans to look after themselves', which, in plain words, means that God had forsaken them.

Of course Goering's speech was full of fulsome praise of Hitler, the 'God-sent man', of 'clear insight' and 'the political and strategic genius with wide outlook' but it is difficult to believe that the praise was genuine, because later in the course of the same speech he also referred to Hitler's Himalayan blunder in misjudging the Russian strength. By sending poor and ill-equipped soldiers to the Finnish Campaign RUSSIA deliberately deceived Hitler. The God-sent man was hood-winked and fooled; and he betrayed his country by rushing in where Napoleon had tried and failed. Goering's oratory is also suspicious as it looks like a covert attempt to excuse himself for the failures of German strategy and fasten the blame on Hitler instead.

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**A REGIME OF BLOOD.** This is the fate of tyrants and of tyranny, alarms around, distrust and dismay at home and final ruin abroad. It was a bad day for GERMANY when 10 years ago Hitler became the Chancellor of her Third Reich. Then began a régime of horror and ruthlessness, of pogroms and terrorism. Racial superiority became a craze, Jewish persecution a pastime, anti-Bolshevism a slogan and Versailles a battle-cry. At home, the Gestapo and the Concentration Camp, and abroad, aggression aimed at world-dominion. Given a long rope by a tolerant and foolish EUROPE Hitler has had his day for a decade, and having risen from terror to horror his sun is now setting in the blood spangled Russian snows and amidst the sands of the African desert. The steel ring, to use Captain Oliver Lyttleton's expressive phrase, is closing round the tyrant, in three major arcs—Stalin's army in the East, General Alexander's in the MIDDLE EAST, and General Eisenhower's in N. AFRICA, not to speak of the sea-blockade which the Royal Navy has imposed from GIBRALTAR to MURMANSK and the unceasing air-attacks of the R. A. F. over most part of Hitler's EUROPE.

**FRANTIC EFFORTS** are in progress or are in contemplation to prop the fabric of Hitler's declining fortunes. 'He who deserts the colours shall be hanged; he who surrenders in the midst of battle shall be put to death' says a radio announcement. Goebbels writes in the *Das Reich*, 'measures which are about to be taken will delve deeply into the life of the individual and sometimes into the life of the family. Only a generation of steel will survive the hurricane of our time.' A BERNE dispatch speaks of compulsory universal mobilisation of German boys from the age of 15 upwards for tasks of 'secondary importance', and in order to release men for the front.

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**PEACE MOVE?** There is indication that Hitler may launch a peace-offensive in the early future, prepared to drop his Italian and Japanese comrades, if need be, in order to save himself and this is one of the reasons why President Roosevelt, in anticipation named the CASABLANCA meeting Unconditional-Surrender Conference. This is also the reason that lately the Japanese have shown great concern over the rumours that German agents had been seen taking soundings in Allied camps of the chances of a peace-offer. The *News Chronicle* mentions 'a persistent rumour' that obviously for this purpose General Franco was seen at CASABLANCA in the capacity of an Axis emissary in the week of the Roosevelt-Churchill meeting.

As a step towards total mobilisation BERLIN restaurants have been closed down, turning over their personnel to the armaments industry. One-fifth of all German periodicals will cease publication. Agents and salesmen will no longer call on their customers. Meetings of the Boards of Joint Stock Companies will not be held and all business establishments not necessary for the war will be closed.

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**MUSSOLINI'S FEAR.** Mussolini too is filled with fear. Among the many rumours which reached President Roosevelt at CASABLANCA one was that King Emmanual of ITALY had arrived to see him in order to arrange for his country's surrender. Unwilling to give a chance to the R. A. F. to visit him at the time of his oration Mussolini made a speech on Feb. 1 to Fascist Youths, 'somewhere in Central Italy'. The Italian people, he said, 'have received the news of the occupation of LIBYA with Roman calm and will not give in while they have the strength to grasp a weapon'. It is a wail unworthy of a man who boasts his descent from the ancient Romans.

Mussolini also is moblising every one in ITALY except invalids and people over 63, by closing theatres, cafés and foodshops.

**THE NEUTRALS** The time has also come when the few remaining neutrals in Europe should make up their minds and cast their lot either with the Allies or the Axis, when SPAIN should decide about the CANARIES and the BALEARIC ISLANDS and her own homeland, TURKEY, about the DARDANELLES, and SWEDEN, on her alliance whether between GERMANY and RUSSIA.

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**WILL HITLER RESIGN ?** During the past few days rumours have been circulating that Hitler may abandon his personal command of the Wehrmacht and if he did, it would be a confession of defeat and the beginning of the end of his Chancellorship.

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**THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CASABLANCA.** The arrival of the U. S. President from the New world to the Old for the first time in history is a portent of Hitler's doom—indicative of a punishment which since CASABLANCA seems to be imminent. Let us hear the lion's voice of Mr. Churcill from NICOSIA (CYPRESS). 'Now I am able to assure you that the United Nations represent incomparably the strongest group of human beings that have ever been marshalled in arms in the whole history of the world, not only in their numbers, not only in the great armaments that are now being prepared on a scale hitherto unexampled, not only in their material force, but in their unity of purpose, their comradeship and their inflexible resolution.

They are strong and will march forward from strength to strength unti, unconditional surrender is extorted from those who have laid the world in havoc and ruins.'

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**ADANA** is a continuation of CASABLANCA, in the sense that it is a sequel of action, following on the important decisions arrived between the British Premier and the U. S. President at CASABLANCA. Flying from CASABLANCA and after a short stay in CAIRO Churchill visited TURKEY on January 30 and 31, as a guest of the Turkish Government and met President Inonu and his staff at ADANA, where he reached 'an important agreement on the manner in which GREAT BRITAIN and the U.S. would be able to help TURKEY materially to consolidate her defensive security.' Post-war problems were also discussed.

The ADANA conference is important in many ways. It means, firstly BRITAIN's recognition of the honourable part, the part of correct neutrality,

which TURKEY maintained in the dark days of German ascendancy, when GREECE fell and the enemy threatened the MIDDLE EAST. It means, secondly, that the Mediterranean, being now increasingly free from Axis interference, has become ripe for further military operations to attack the foe from his under-side. It indicates that the Russo-Turkish relations have improved and that the hour may be near at hand when she may be in need of assistance to maintain her 'defensive security'. Hitler, foiled in his Caucasian and Egyptian campaigns, may still attempt to break through TURKEY towards the Persian oil-fields. In post-war matters TURKEY had a decisive part to play in the reconstruction of the BALKANS.

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**NORTH AFRICAN POLITICS.** The political tangle in NORTH AFRICA, which we thought had been unravelled after the Giraud—De Gaulle meeting at CASABLANCA has, as subsequent reports show, not yet been resolved. While there is agreement on joint military endeavours De Gaulle is for a central political Power, a Republican régime and a purge of pro-Vichy elements, while Giraud, inheriting the earlier Vichy administration has difficulties in taking any drastic steps. Genl. Giraud, estimating the strength of De Gaulles' forces at 15 to 20 thousand would not amalgamate them with his own army of 300,000. De Gaulle states that his army is one hundred, and not twenty, thousand. So the deadlock continues. It is something that they have met, though much cannot be expected from a first meeting. It is also something that a step has been taken forward by appointing liaison committees for the exchange of views on technical, military and financial matters. It is further significant that lease-lend help has been promised 'on a large-scale' to the Fighting French only 'if and when Genl. Giraud and Genl. De Gaulle reached complete agreement.'

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**ROOSEVELT-VARGAS MEETING.** While Mr. Churchill flew eastward to TURKEY after a brief halt at CAIRO to meet President Inonu, President Roosevelt flew westward after a brief stay in LIBERIA to meet President Vargas of BRAZIL at NATAL on the Brazilian east coast, and like Mr. Churchill with TURKEY, reached a perfect agreement on matters relating to Brazilian co-operation. In a joint statement the two Presidents have stated that 'it is their common aim to make the Atlantic safe for all and that permanent arrangements should exist so that 'the coast of West AFRICA and DAKAR will never again, in any circumstances, be used as a blockade or invasion threat against the Americas.'

**THE RUSSIAN SITUATION.** Roughly stated, Hitler's battered legions are now in full retreat towards the line they originally occupied before beginning the last summer offensive. This is what is meant by straightening the line and forming a new front. The great industrial basin of the Donetz has been half-encircled and Russian guns, are reported to be now heard at ROSTOV. With the Russian crossing of the Don and the Donetz Hitler has lost his Kuban grain, with the fall of MAIKOP, his Russian oil and with the capture of TIKHOVETSK, his hold on the CAUCASUS.

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**THE MARETH LINE.** Speculation is rife about what Rommel will do now that he is before the Mareth Line. Will he make a stand here? All will depend on what will happen in the TUNIS-BIZERTA zone in the next few weeks. The Mareth Line is a series of concrete forts, pill-boxes and barracks, stretching from the coast, south of GABES, through the town of MARETH, to the hills, 30 miles inland. Through this gap any army invading TUNISIA from LIBYA must pass. Behind the Line lies MADININE, an air-base providing air-defence to the line. Here Von Arnim has assembled an army of 75,000 men and here Rommel is expected to bring another 50,000 men of his beaten army. Von Arnim holds the coastal plain from the TRIPOLITANIA frontier to TUNIS while the Allies are in the hilly country to the West. So far the Germans are in possession of the valleys dividing the opposing armies and they recently made an attempt without success, to dislodge the French standing here in the way of Rommel's retreat, that is, between PONT DU FAHS and KHAIRWAN. Meanwhile a new threat to Rommel's retreat has appeared by the advance of the American forces to MAKANASI, 75 miles north-west of the Line and 50 miles from SFAX on the coast. If the two Axis armies are to join hands the Allied occupation of the coast should be prevented at all costs. This is the problem which must now be exercising the mind of the Axis High Command. On the Allied part the fighting is going to be difficult even after the junction of the 8th and 1st armies. The terrain is difficult and the rains will impede operations for at least another month.

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**BURMA OPERATIONS.** It is a step forward and a matter for pride that the Royal Indian Navy is now co-operating with the British and Indian ground forces in BURMA. The enemy has no longer the monopoly of the coast. The other day an R. I. N. vessel sank a country-boat carrying Japanese soldiers. Japanese resistance is taking the same line here as in the South Pacific and is dogged and desperate, resisting every small position before ejection. Though the control of the Bay is a condition precedent

to a large-scale attack on BURMA this kind of warfare—the bleeding of the enemy at the extremities, as it were, is good so far as it goes. One of the most heartening features of the compaign is our air suprermacy which is working such havoc on enemy aerodromes, docks, railways and water ways, compared with which the Japanese attempts at reprisal are puerile.

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**Anti-Hoarding Measures in Pudukkottai State.** In the last issue of the Bulletin we had occasion to discuss the difficulties of the Food Problem in the country and to point out that welcome as the measures, such as control of exports and imports, of the Central Government were as a long-term policy, the remedy, both immediate and simple for local hardship would be the control of the local hoarder and profiteer. We therefore pleaded for a civic battle on the narrow home-front of secret godowns and black-markets. In doing so we were guided not merely by speculation but by our experience and knowledge locally gained, of the benefits, which have accrued by the adoption of such measures in the PUDUKKOTTAI State from as early as August last.

Herein PUDUKKOTTAI may claim to have taken a pioneer step. Under a Regulation hoarding, that is, the keeping of food-grains, condiments, illuminants and other essential articles, in excess, has been made an offence, in the State punishable with fine as well as imprisonment. 'Excess', in the case of a trader means any quantity held over and above a normal three months' sale, and in the case of others anything held over and above a year's domestic consumption. Traders wilfully omitting or refusing to sell or to sell at a fair price come under the same category and are liable to the same punishment. State officers of a certain grade have power to enter and break-open places of suspected hoarding, and to seize and sell in public auction the articles in excess, the net proceeds going to the owner. Measures, such as these, we believe would bring relief.

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## BRIGHTENING VISTAS.

*Mr. Churchill.* *Cairo, Feb. 2.*

We have practically delivered Egypt from danger of invasion from the west for any period which we can imagine or foresee.

I should like to remind you that at our last meeting, I said Egypt would be effectively defended, that Cairo would bo swept clear of those threatening

it with invasion, that Britain would not be found to have failed one jot or tittle in her long-standing engagements to this historic land, and that Britain would be found successful in keeping the horrors of war from the population of this vast city.

**The Eighth Army will follow Rommel as he goes fugitive from Egypt and Libya.**

Meanwhile, on the other flank on which the enemy could attack us from the north, the prodigious victories of the Russian Armies have altered entirely the situation which we were bound to contemplate as a possibility and prepare for. We formed the Tenth Army in Persia and Iraq under the distinguished command of General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, in order to be ready for a movement of the enemy falling on us from the north.

All this has been put aside by the tremendous feats of arms fought by the gallant troops of our Russian Allies under the General Command of M. Stalin, a great warrior, a name which will live long, and will be most loved in the history of the Russian people.

We must expect very considerable fighting in the next few months or weeks. I, for my part have confidence in the result, and I also believe the desert Army, which started from Cairo, will play a note worthy part in achieving the final result, namely, the ejection from Africa of every enemy Italian or German soldier.

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# CONTROL YOUR TONGUE.

## DO NOT LISTEN TO BASELESS RUMOURS.

Message sent by

**Sir Alexander Tottenham, C. I. E.,**

*Administrator, Pudukkottai State*

On the occasion of the celebration of

The Pudukkottai College Day—on 29—1—43.

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,

I have been asked to send you a message.

2. I should not be telling you anything that you do not know already if I expatiated on the objects and advantages of celebrations like this, which are obvious, and of which no doubt you are already convinced.

3. But I should like to take this opportunity to give the younger generation assembled here a few words of advice and I hope they will find them valuable especially at the present time. Firstly, learn to control your tongue. You will be then able to control yourselves. This may even give you a chance of being able to control others. Do not listen to, still less spread, baseless rumours. What may appear to you harmless gossip may in fact prove to be very harmful to your country, and service to the country must be your ideal.

4. I wish the celebrations every success.

# THE FACE BEHIND THE MASK.

Some persons who have seen the striking poster with the caption "Beware of the Mask of Friendship" which shows a smiling Japanese mask side by side with a sinister and wholly evil looking Japanese face, have dismissed it with a shrug of the shoulders and the word 'Propaganda'! We fight shy of this word, as if, by itself it was something silly and puerile, or worse, positively wicked. This isn't true. Propaganda is a method of presenting a statement of fact or an idea—almost anything. Like a syringe it can be filled with dirty slops or clear water from a mountain stream. There is truthful propaganda as well as false propaganda. The poster entitled "Beware of the Mask of Friendship" is an apt illustration of the first and the "Co-prosperity sphere" made in Japan, is an example of the second. Proof? Listen to the Japanese broadcast from Rangoon. "Japan has given a pledge through the person of Tojo himself, that Burma shall gain its independence if it joins the co-prosperity sphere. This is not an empty promise. It is a pledge that was broadcast to the whole world". Before the Japanese armies entered Burma, the country was promised independence as soon as British and Allied armies were driven out. The smiling Japanese mask made the promises. When the Japanese had succeeded in occupying Burma, the face behind the mask spoke on the 27th November. The story is different now. Listen to the revised version. "Tojo has said that Burma will be independent, but the Burmese must ask themselves *about how their country shall be freed.* It is only by defending their country that they can obtain independence. It must not merely be defended against the enemy. In war, it is necessary to get in before one's enemy and attack him first. For that we need to have men and sufficient arms. The population of Burma, is small, *and therefore all Burmese, from children upwards, must do their share.* If there are many among the Burmese who are not keen to join the army, *then Burma, is not fit for independence*"! So the Burmese must be conscripted to fight Japan's battles!

'Propaganda again', says the sceptic of course. Yes, but truthful propaganda is our answer, for listen to Premier Tojo broadcasting to his people on the same day, on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the promulgation of the conscription system in Japan. He said: "We are all the soldiers of the Emperor, and by winning this Greater East Asia War, we must perfect the spirit of universal conscription". Universal conscription in occupied countries, to fight Japan's imperialist wars! That's the true contour of Nippon's face—the wicked face behind the smiling mask of friendship. Let us profit by the experience of others. We shall not be duped.

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# EUROPE'S FIGHTERS IN EXILE

*(George Roboz)*

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For the first time in history, the recognized Governments of eight Allied countries—Poland, Norway, Holland, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Luxembourg, Yugoslavia and Greece have established their headquarters in England.

One of the brightest chapters of the war, and one which has been lost in the flurry of headlines, is the story of these Governments-in-exile which have gone on fighting even after their countries had been overrun. Their contributions to the united war effort have been so great that their importance will probably not be fully determined until the war is over.

Militarily, the eight Governments-in-exile have put an army of 300,000 men in the field. The Poles, though theirs was the first country overrun in the war, have the fifth largest army among the United Nations—150,000 men in Russia, Iran, Egypt and England.

## FIGHTING ARMIES

Recruits escaping from conquered Europe at night in small boats are also swelling the ranks of the Greek, Belgian, Dutch, Norwegian and Yugoslav armies in exile. Fighting French Units—though General de Gaulle's movement is not recognized as a Government-in-exile—have fought in the Middle East. In the Ethiopian campaign, French Spahis, Foreign Legionnaires and Colonial troops marched 1,000 miles through the heart of Africa to help break up Mussolini's East African empire.

In the air, 10,000 Poles, 1,000 Czechs and 800 Greeks are flying with the Royal Air Force, The Polish Kosciuszko squadron before it was switched to

night-fighter duty bagged many Nazis like the other famous squadrons in the Royal Air Force, was famous for taking more chances "than the buses in Piccadilly during the rush hour". Polish, Czech, and other "exiled" airmen helped form the umbrella of air power over the Channel that made the Ranger-Commando raid on Dieppe possible.

The Norwegian and French navies, 110 ships including one battleship, light-cruisers, destroyers, corvettes and mine-sweepers, are also fighting, as is the bulk of the Dutch fleet which escaped from the East Indies, and several Polish destroyers.

The Colonial empires of the Governments-in-exile are contributing sizeably to the United Nations' war effort.

### POST-WAR PLANS

Politically, despite the fact that they rule no more on the continent of Europe than the hearts of the people they represent, the Governments-in-exile have prevented the Axis from consolidating its territorial gains, have kept it from setting up Nazi-controlled governments in Poland, Greece, Yugoslavia, Holland and elsewhere which could claim to represent the people. Even in Norway, where the Nazis succeeded in setting up the Quisling Government, the Norwegians owe allegiance to King Haakon, and take every opportunity to show it.

The Governments-in-exile are also taking an active role in planning for post-war Europe.

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# THE CHARACTER OF SEA POWER.

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Sea power spells world power in a world whose surface is more than 70 per cent sea. Four great oceans lap the shores of six small continents. From the ice bound shores of Antarctica to the ice bound shores of Greenland in the far north, the salt waves roll against coasts of stormy rocks or sunlit sand, safe harbours for sailors or secret death traps for unwary seamen. Asia, 17,000,000 square miles, the biggest continent, faces to the north the Arctic Ocean, 5,500,000 square miles, to the east the Pacific Ocean, 64,000,000 square milles, to the south the Indian Ocean 28,300,000 square miles. Europe, for all its power and wealth is a mere 3,800,000 square miles. More than seven Europes would fit into the Indian Ocean alone, and more than sixteen into

the Pacific Ocean. North and South America together measure 15,000,000 square miles, less than half the area of the Atlantic Ocean, which is 31,500,000 square miles. The great continent of Africa in only 11,500,000 square miles. Five Africas would fit comfortably into the Pacific. Antarctica and Australia, 3,000,000 and 3,500,000 square miles, seen from the moon would appear as tiny islands in a vast waste of waters.

Although the past abounds with practical masters of naval strategy, it was left for the American Rear-Admiral Mahan to set out in clear terms the theory behind the use of sea power. He published his first work, "The Influence of Sea Power upon History 1660-1783" in 1890, and this publication revolutionised the study of naval history throughout the world. Mahan chose for his special study Nelson, the greatest of all English admirals, and the main points in the doctrine which he taught were that naval control of the sea is interdependent with commercial control and that commerce dominates war. To-day we may recall with interest that he was the leading advocate in his time in America, of close friendship with Britain and he saw in Anglo-American naval supremacy the surest guarantee of world peace. He died on December 1st, 1914, having foretold the defeat of Germany and the surrender of the German navy.

Broadly Mahan's doctrine is unchallengeable; the facts of five thousand years of history prove its truth. Under certain conditions in a struggle between a land power and sea power of approximately equal strength the sea power is bound to win. The conditions necessary are first, that the sea power should have bases secure from the attacks of land power without naval support; secondly, that the sea power should have a fighting navy adequately backed by a powerful mercantile marine, and thirdly that the sea power should not make the mistake of indulging in land expeditions on a scale sufficient to interfere with the successful development of its naval strength. Tyre and Egypt fell for lack of secure land bases. Athens in her war against Sparta, and Carthage in her fight with Rome failed because they indulged in land fighting on a scale which prevented the maintenance of adequate naval power; no other sea power has fallen except on account of decay in power and clash with another sea power of superior strength.

In the world to-day there are three great powers at sea, the British Empire, U. S. A., and Japan. In all other countries the navy is a mere local auxiliary to land power.

The British Empire has most trouble over the point of security of base. England was a secure base till the advent of the aeroplane, but to-day a continental power without naval force can strike an island from the air. Therefore it follows that Great Britain in self-defence must maintain air supremacy in western Europe. The battle of Britain in the air in the autumn of 1940 will rank in history as a victory of decisive importance in the naval strategy of the war. Britain has the additional advantage of maintaining

powerful naval bases in all seas of the world. These bases serve as cover for fleets protecting the communications of the empire and as bases for naval attack on hostile powers far from Britain's home bases. Owning 21,000,000 tons of shipping, 30 per cent of the world's merchant tonnage in 1939, the British Empire was far better equipped with commercial shipping than any other power.

The U. S. A. is not naturally a naval power. America is almost self-sufficient commercially, and for all her size owned a merchant navy in 1939 about half that of Britain. But being wealthy beyond all other powers and knowing full well the importance of sea power in world politics, the U. S. A. maintains a professional navy whose construction and fighting qualities have been proved in this war to be second to none. In size the U. S. navy is nearly equal to the British, and has superiority in heavy cruisers.

Japan lags far behind these two powers, and can exercise only local superiority at sea in the western Pacific. Though more secure at home than Britain is, Japan has made the cardinal mistake of involving herself in a costly struggle on land with China. Japan is a poor country with comparatively small resources, and her correct róle in history should have been to develop her commerce and commercial shipping to be an adjunct to her sea power, and at all costs to avoid continental adventures costly in military effort. But, plunged by a reckless group of military politicians into a costly war with China, Japan has been unable to develop her air power and her sea power to a point at which she can intervene in a world struggle against America and the British Empire with any hope of ultimate success. For a time indeed Japan can produce overwhelming local naval superiority in Far Eastern waters, but her only hope in the war lay in the chance that the U. S. navy would prove inferior in fighting qualities and construction to the Japanese. The battles of Midway Island, the Coral Sea and the Solomons have proved that this hope was a delusion, and the conclusion is inescapable that the destruction of Japan is already written in the pages of the future.

For Britain and the U. S. A. however the future promises well. The intervention of the great land power of Russia has neutralised the land power and air power of Germany for a critical year in Europe. Churchill's steady refusal to open a second front in Europe prematurely, and Roosevelt's and Churchill's intervention in North Africa prove how well the leaders of the U. S. A. and the British Empire appreciate the vital importance of sea power and know how to conserve and wield it. The vast constructional power of U. S. A. and Britain promises an overwhelming preponderance of naval force in a short time.

But the rest of the world, particularly those countries which geographically or economically are unable to maintain strong navies, may well wonder what fate Anglo-American friendship and sea power may spell for them. Is this war merely being fought to decide whether Germany or Britain or U.S.A.

shall rule the nations? Let all who ask this question find comfort in the history of sea power. History conclusively proves that just as great military power influences national politics towards aggressive domination, naval power has a liberalising influence on the sentiments of a people. Seamanship is primarily the servant of commerce, and a fighting navy is an adjunt of trade. A sailor spends his life in battling with the elements; he has no desire to add to his dangers and discomforts by fighting with his fellowmen. While a soldier is trained to war, a sailor is trained to the sea, and the science of seamanship is the science of sailing and not fighting on the ocean. No sailor therefore, naval or merchant, needs a war in which to fulfil his life's work. A sailor too sees foreign ports and depends for his comfort and livelihood on foreign friends: he has none of the narrowness and insularity of the peasant rooted to his fields. It would be tedious to pursue this matter through the hundreds of instances that can be quoted from history. Let one suffice: Britain in 1811 finally brought the slave trade to an end throughout the British Empire by the last of a series of measures taken in the course of a life and death struggle with Napoleon, and slavery as an institution ceased throughout the Empire in 1833. It was not till 1863, thirty years later that this step was taken in the United States, then a predominantly continental power; in the U. S. A. this step was taken only after a war between the maritime and liberal States of New England and the conservative and land owning Southern States.

A sea power will always pursue peace and mutually beneficial trade. I is not really profitable to dominate or cheat your customers, and hard economit circumstances will keep a sea power in the paths of peace and good neighbourliness which a military power is apt to treat with impatience and disrespect.

In the present war a victory for sea power is to be desired by all who long for peace, liberty and peaceful progress.

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# GERMAN AND BRITISH STRATEGY.

(*From the Nineteenth Century and After*).

Every nation has its own way of making war. Even when the Germans are not preparing a specific war, they will always think in terms of attack. To say that they are an aggressor nation is not to pass a moral judgment but to register a fact. Germany is so situated that her only chance of winning a war is to take the offensive immediately and to maintain it until her foes are beaten. This she must do for two reasons. She must, in the first place, try to win before her conflict with this or that opponent or coalition of opponents become a universal conflict, and, in the second place, she must, if she has failed to prevent a local war from becoming a world war, break through the encirclement which, if unbroken, must lead to her defeat. The German fear of encirclement is not as unreasonable as it is usually supposed to be. The

Germans must, because of their central situation, always endeavour to avert every conceivable encircling coalition, whether by peaceful means or by war.

The Germans, therefore, always will, because they always must, take the offensive, whether that offensive be political, or military, or both. That is why their wars are always planned far in advance. For final victory they depend, and must depend, on their initial striking power. If they were to remain on the defensive, they would lose every chance of victory, for they would be encircled and blockaded and have war on at least two fronts—that is to say, the essential conditions of a German defeat would be fulfilled.

If their initial offensive or series of offensives, has failed, they must pass from the offensive to the defensive, not in the hope of imposing a 'German peace', for that hope, if entertained at all, will have become illusory, but of securing terms that will at least leave the foundations of their armed might undestroyed. They will endeavour to prolong hostilities until the enemy is induced by losses, by war-weariness, and perhaps by internal disunity to negotiate a compromise. If they cannot win the war, they will try to win the peace. That is their way out, and, for them, the only right way.

The English, with their immensely long overseas communications, their vast and scattered Empire, and their highly vulnerable island realm, must think initially in terms of the general defensive. Whereas the Germans are able to concentrate their full initial strength on one of their two main fronts, the English can never concentrate their initial strength at all, for they will always have an indefinite number of fronts. They may, indeed they must, take the offensive at the earliest possible moment, but their main initial preoccupation must be defensive. Only when the enemy is held everywhere can they pass from the general defensive to the general offensive. This way of making war is the opposite of the German, and is, for them, the only right way.

A nation that can only be attacked on two fronts and must always take the initial offensive on one of them will always go to war with a definite plan and a clear strategic conception. Its initial task is simple. A nation that can be attacked on an indefinite number of fronts, and must defend all of them, is condemned to strategic empiricism. It may, indeed it must, have many plans—but it cannot have only *one* plan.

As the war goes on and the initial offensive of the enemy is soon to fail, he will again and again be faced by alternatives, and his one plan will be succeeded by other plans that will follow one another in ever increasing number, until there is no plan at all, except the desperate, empirical defence of the strategic frontiers.

While Germany's task grows more complex the task of Great Britain and her Allies grows more simple. The Germans, having begun the war with a central strategic conception, will end it without one. Great Britain and her

Allies on the other hand, having begun the war without one, will end it with one.

The Germans could not wage war the English way and the English could not wage it the German way. There is strength and weakness in either way. If the initial plan goes wrong and successive plans also fail, it will be necessary to fall back on a resolute empiricism. But *initial* empiricism will never win the war. If it has been successful in holding the enemy, however vast the territories he has overrun and however long and tenuous the fronts, it will be necessary to work towards a general plan for closing in upon him, a plan which must culminate in the final decisive concentration.

There will be a point when the German and English ways intersect, as it were: when the Germans pass from planning to empiricism and the English from empiricism to a general strategic plan. That point is the turning point of the war. Towards that point we have now begun to move.

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# THE MEDITERRANEAN BASE.

(*From the Nineteenth Century and After*).

If the Allies command the Mediterranean, south-eastern Europe can, in time, be opened to invasion. The innumerable islands in the Aegean and the Adriatic and the deeply indented and rocky nature of the immensely long eastern and middle Mediterranean coast-line are unfavourable to defence and therefore favourable to invasion. Even now, the Germans and Italians have been unable to subdue those Jugoslavian districts which, by reason of their mountainous character, cannot easily be overrun by armoured divisions. The hero-patriot Mihailovic and his *chetniks*, the Serb, Croat, and Slovene *partisans*, and a generally rebellious population, are even now engaging some thirty of the enemy's divisions. Most of those who inhabit the territories that extend from the Aegean to the German border are not only filled with hatred of the Germans but are burning—and organised—to take up arms against them.

An Allied invasion of Western Europe might compel the Germans to withdraw from Russia and from South-eastern Europe, but Germany's western defences are immensely powerful, both by nature and by artifice. Perhaps they are impregnable and the attempt to take them by assault might mean losses incurred in vain and comparable with those suffered on the Somme and at Passchendaele in the last war. But in the south-east, Germany is extremely vulnerable, in a political and economic, as well as in a strategic sense. Indeed, if the Allies are able to establish themselves in South-eastern Europe, Germany's doom is certain—and can be achieved with relatively little loss.

Even if the Allies were to reach the Western German frontier, or the whole length of the Rhine itself, the Germans, if they held the vast hinterland

of Eastern and South-eastern Europe and had the use of its immense resources, might still be able to prolong the war in the expectation that weariness, strain and heavy losses would create a popular movement in favour of a negotiated peace throughout the Allied Countries, especially Great Britain. But long before the Allied armies reached the German south-eastern border, the Germans would have to sue for terms.

Germany can live without Western Europe, but she cannot live, still less fight, without eastern and south-eastern Europe. The road to victory is from Cairo to Berlin.

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# JAPAN'S PLIGHT.
## A BOX WITHOUT A LID.

Japanese conquests are like a big box, one side running down through Burma and Malaya, the front running along the Netherlands East Indies, the other side running up through the Philippines to Japan. The box is a strong one, but it has no top unless Japan can defeat China, which she has failed to do in over five years, and it has two weak corners. Opposite one corner is India, opposite the other Australia, both enormously strong depóts of Allied strength, whence the Japanese know will come the blows which will break the box.

The Japanese, like all aggressors, could not afford to stop. Australia must be occupied, hence the battle of the Coral Sea to seize Port Moresby as a jumping off place for an invasion; American aid to Australia must be interrupted, hence Midway and the ill-fated push into the Solomons, which has led to Guadalcanar. She would have liked to attack India or Ceylon, or both, but the gallant resistance in Burma, though it did not save that country, so delayed the Japanese that the monsoon was upon them before they could attempt anything against India overland; while the resistance they encountered in their reconnaissance in April against Ceylon showed them that they would need greater forces, naval and air, for a full scale attack than they could spare from their other operations. Japan therefore had to choose between India and Australia. She chose Australia and failed.

In her failure she lost many warships, many men, and more important than men, she lost many aircraft and many merchant ships. Japan can still afford to lose men, but she cannot afford to lose warships or merchants ships. She cannot afford to lose aircraft. The reason for this is the comparative smallness of her manufacturing potential. A country's manufacturing potential is measured by several things, its supply of steel, its supply of machines and technicians, its available man-power; in all these, except man-power, Japan is deficient as compared to the United Nations, and this deficiency must become more apparent as time goes on. Aggressor nations start a war with a great advantage. They attack at a time of their own choosing when they are at the peak of thir preparedness, but, it follows naturally that, if they

cannot succeed within a reasonable space of time, and if the resources of the nations they attack are greater than theirs, there must come a point when the balance swings and they go down the hill while their enemies get strong.

This point has already been reached and is now being passed in the case of Japan. For six months she carried all before her. Then there was a see-saw period of equilibrium. Now the scales are going down the other way, and Japan is now strategically, industrially and economically on the defensive. This does not mean that she will never attack ; but basically her policy must be defensive and her object must be to conserve her aircrft, conserve her ships, and strengthen her conquests against the day when she has to defend them and Japan against the full weight of the Allied attack.

---

## TURKEY

*Some Data.*

(1) Oct. 19, 1939, the Anglo—Franco—Turkish Treaty of Mutual Assistance.

(2) June 18, 1941, the German—Turkish pact of Non-Aggression (Turkey explained this was a precautionary measure, not incompatible with her engagements to the Allies).

(3) Aug. 10, 1941, the joint Anglo-Russian Declaration that Britain and Russia would come to Turkey's assistance if Turkey were attacked,

(4) Since the outbreak of the war, the Turkish Army has been kept up to full mobilised strength and the whole country is on a defence footing. Large sums have been spent on national defence in recent years.

(5) Though defeated in 1918, the Turkish Army made a remarkable recovery under Kemal Ataturk. For a large time Turkey lacked equipment but this has since been supplied by the Allies and is believed to be not only as good as, but greatly superior to, that of most Balkan armies.

---

# 'FREE' EUROPE.

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A new decree that no Polish man under 28 and no woman under 25 may marry is a fresh step in the German plan to reduce the fertility of the Polish nation. The decree, which applies in the three Polish western provinces 'incorporated' in the Reich, is supplemented by an order that any illegitimate child born to a woman under 25 shall be immediately placed in a State institution. The mother herself is liable to imprisonment.

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# PROGRAMME.

## LECTURE CXXXII. (*Batch 3*)

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 6- 2-43 | Municipal Office. | 6.00 p.m. |
| 7- 2-43 | Alangudi ... | 7.00 „ |
| „ | Rasiamangalam. | 7.30 „ |
| 8- 2-43 | Annavasal ... | 7.00 „ |
| „ | Kilakkurichchi... | 7.30 „ |
| 9- 2-43 | Kulipirai ... | 7.00 „ |
| „ | Sevalur ... | 7.30 „ |
| 10- 2-43 | C. S. M. High School. | 10.00 a.m. |
| „ | Rani's High School. | 10.15 „ |
| 10- 2-43 | College A English | 10.15 a.m. |
| „ | College B Tamil. | 10.15 „ |
| „ | Ramachandra-puram. | 7.00 p.m. |
| „ | Rayavaram ... | 7.30 „ |
| 11- 2-43 | Malaiyur ... | 7.00 „ |
| „ | Karambakkudi... | 7.30 „ |
| 12- 2-43 | Valaramanikkam. | 7.00 „ |
| „ | Embal ... | 7.30 „ |

## LECTURE CXXXIII. (*Batch 4.*)

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 13- 2-43 | Municipal Office. | 6.00 p.m. |
| 14- 2-43 | Nirpalani ... | 7.00 „ |
| „ | Avoor ... | 7.30 „ |
| 15- 2-43 | Karaiyur ... | 7.00 „ |
| „ | Idaiyathur ... | 7.30 „ |
| 16- 2-43 | Vadavalam ... | 7.00 „ |
| „ | Sammattividuthi | 7·30 „ |
| 17- 2-43 | C. S. M. High School. | 10.00 a.m. |
| 17- 2-43 | Rani's High School. | 10.15 a.m. |
| „ | College A English | 10.15 „ |
| „ | College B Tamil. | 10.15 „ |
| „ | Nartamalai ... | 7.00 p.m. |
| „ | Uppiliakkudi ... | 7.30 „ |
| 18- 2-43 | Andakkulam ... | 7.00 „ |
| „ | Killanur ... | 7.30 „ |
| 19 -2-43 | Konnaiyur ... | 7.00 „ |
| „ | Melaveguppatti. | 7.30 „ |

## RECRUITING—ADVERTISEMENT—4 p. m.

| | |
|---|---|
| 6— 2—43 | Vettamviduthi. |
| 7— 2—43 | Embal. |
| 8— 2—43 | Konnaiyur. |
| 9— 2—43 | Ramachandrapuram. |
| 10— 2—43 | Rayavaram. |
| 11— 2—43 | Kulipirai. |
| 12— 2—43 | Pappapatti. |
| 13— 2—43 | Ponnamaravathi. |
| 14— 2—43 | Kodumbalur. |
| 15— 2—43 | Kiranur. |
| 16— 2—43 | Kudimiyamalai. |
| 17— 2—43 | Karambakkudi. |
| 18— 2—43 | Kilanilai. |
| 19— 2—43 | Pudukkottai. |

Sri Brihadamba State Press, Pudukkottai. 750—7-2-43.